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1. Introduction of a new term 
In 1914 Joseph Babinski performed a common, scientific act that nevertheless 
had far-reaching consequences: he presented a paper in which he introduced a new 
neologism, anosognosia (from the Greek, α = without, νόσος = disease, γνώσις = 
knowledge) to describe behaviours previously noted by himself and others (see 
Berrios & Markova, this issue). In the 1914 paper, Babinski observed how some 
patients with left hemiplegia were “unaware of or seem to be unaware of the existence 
of the paralysis which affects them” (Babinski, 1914, see translation by Langer & 
Levine, this issue, pp. XXX). The paper was accompanied by many fascinating 
commentaries (see translation by Langer & Levine, this issue) and anosognosia has 
since been at the focus of much medical and scientific research, including two 
dedicated volumes of collected essays (Prigatano, 2010; Prigatano & Schacter, 1991) 
and hundreds of scientific papers (see Nurmi & Jehkonen, this issue, for a review). In 
the years since Babinski, definitions have been modified and extended to include 
unawareness of numerous disorders, multiple domains, and now includes several 
subtypes. This year marks the 100th anniversary of Babinski introducing the term, and 
this special issue aims to provide a 21st century equivalent of Babinski’s original 
work: a reference point for recent developments in the field, and a fertile environment 
for the generation of novel hypotheses. 
 
2.1. The changing face of anosognosia research: Current Answers to 100-year-old 
Questions 
Since 1914 the study of anosognosia has undergone considerable development. 
First, the term anosognosia has been broadened in scope to encompass an array of 
failures to appreciate the presence or severity of various neurological deficits, such as 
hemianaesthesia or apraxia, following focal lesions, as well as diffuse brain damage 
(see in this issue Canzano, Scandola, Perigo, Aglioti & Moro; Pia et al.; and Ronchi & 
Vallar). In recent years, the condition has also been studied in the context of 
degenerative diseases like Alzheimer’s disease (see Starkstein; and Spalletta et al., 
this issue) and Parkinson’s disease (Amanzio et al., 2010; Jenkinson, Edelstyn, 
Stephens, & Ellis, 2009).  
Second, the methods used to study the neural basis of anosognosia have 
changed dramatically. Babinski could only speculate about the lesion location in his 
patients based on their left hemiplegia. Improvements in structural neuroimaging 
methods have since allowed not only lesion identification in individual patients, but 
also group lesion mapping studies to identify the specific, right hemisphere lesions 
selectively associated with AHP and as opposed to other aspects of the right-
hemisphere syndrome (Berti et al., 2005; Karnath, Baier, & Nägele, 2005). In turn, 
the limitations of such methods and the association between anosognosia and the left 
hemisphere (Cocchini, Beschin, Cameron, Fotopoulou, & Della Sala, 2009) are 
currently been tackled by functional neuroimaging studies, as the current issue 
exemplifies (see Gandola et al.; Baier et al.). These changes in neuroscientific 
methodology are coupled with improvements in behavioural methods, which have 
enriched clinical observations and case studies with well-controlled, psychophysical 
experiments in larger groups of patients (see for example, Saj, Vocat & Vuilleumier, 
and Besharati et al., this issue, as well as Fotopoulou, 2014; Jenkinson & Fotopoulou, 
2010; for reviews).  
Last but certainly not least, these developments have been accompanied by 
progress in the theoretical conceptualisation of anosognosia.  Remarkably, it took 100 
years to answer a lot of the questions posed by Babinski and his contemporaries (see 
Langer & Levine for the rich set of commentaries accompanying Babinki’s paper) 
and in fact several, critical components of the syndrome seem to be elucidated only 
recently, while others are debated to this day. For example, Babinski’s two cases 
differ in that the first patient remains silent when asked to move the affected arm and 
tries to avoid such questions, while the second claims to have moved in front of the 
examiner. This difference between general false beliefs (delusions) about one’s motor 
abilities and more specific claims about moving after ‘confrontation’ techniques has 
long been included in clinical, diagnostic assessments of anosognosia (e.g. Bisiach et 
al., 1986), but it is only in the last 15 years that the presence of such ‘illusory 
movements’ has been experimentally verified (Feinberg, Roane, & Ali, 2000; 
Fotopoulou et al., 2008), influencing theories about non-veridical motor awareness 
(Berti et al., 2007). 
 Another example is the role of motivation in anosognosia. Babinski and his 
contemporaries portray a profound dualism in their thinking. For example, Babinski 
notes that the patients’ relatives considered the unawareness as useful and had asked 
the doctors not to challenge the patients’ tranquillity. He thus wonders whether 
anosognosia is motivated by vanity or self-esteem, or whether it is ‘real’. In his 
commentary, M. Henry Meige writes “while it is common to see an aphasic get angry, 
to bemoan an unsuccessful attempt at speech, the hemiplegic, in contrast, complains 
more rarely of the inertia of his arm or leg. Is it resignation, a wish to hide from 
himself or others a defect that afflicts him? It is possible, in certain cases; but in 
others one is faced with a true psychopathological problem” (see Langer & Levine, 
this issue, pp. XXX). This absolute contrast between a psychological wish to be 
healthy and to deceive the self and others accordingly, and a neurological condition 
that deprives the person of knowledge into their abilities, is a contrast that colours 
most explanations of anosognosia during the 20th century. It is only in the past 15 
years that integrative perspectives have emerged, linking emotion and motivation 
more directly to the brain damage seen in anosognosic patients. In the current issue, 
papers by Turnbull, Fotopoulou and Solms, and Besharati et al. exemplify such 
integrative approaches, challenging rigid distinctions between the psychological and 
neural levels of explanation.    
As we outline in the next section, similar progress is currently noted in 
relation to several facets of the syndrome. In this issue, contributions from leading 
researcher in the field have been gathered together in a unique collection of reviews 
and empirical papers on anosognosia, aiming to give a comprehensive view of the 
current state of knowledge in the field. Remarkably, despite the impressive research 
developments exemplified by these papers, Babinski and his colleagues had raised a 
number of questions that remain unanswered. We thus briefly review the 
aforementioned progress in section 2.2 below, before going on to summarise the 
questions that remain unanswered, as well as the novel ones that are beginning to 
appear after 100 years of research into the syndrome.  
 
2.2. In this issue 
 In the first part of this issue, Langer and Levine provide the first unabridged 
English translation of Babinski’s original paper and its accompanying commentaries – 
allowing non-French speakers the opportunity to read in full the original ideas of 
Babinski and his colleagues. In a specialist historical review, Berrios and Markova 
then consider the early, mostly European and at times, previously untranslated case 
studies on anosognosia and put forward their views on the historical ‘construction’ of 
anosognosia as a unique clinical disorder. In the spirit of Babinski’s original paper, 
Prigatano goes on to describe the pattern of impaired self-awareness observed in 
clinical practice, giving rich clinical descriptions of four patients with various 
disturbance of awareness. In a similar vein, Turnbull et al. use a clinical vignette to 
revisit the history of the rise and fall of one of the older hypothesis of anosognosia, 
namely the motivational hypothesis, and to provide a modern interpretation of the 
syndrome that combines neurocognitive deficits and emotional factors in a single 
formulation. Heilman’s thorough review also highlights the requirement to consider a 
combination of different causes, but his extensive coverage of studies using the 
WADA test and other experimental procedures calls for greater specificity and 
portrays a different view of motivational factors. These careful analyses of the 
mechanisms that may cause anosognosia are followed by a systematic review of the 
incidence and assessment of anosognosia by Nurmi and Jehkonen. They provide a 
comprehensive picture of how research has evolved during the past 35 years, 
highlighting how the focus of anosognosia research has extended over this period to 
include a wider variety of deficits, with anosognosia now firmly established as a 
multifaceted syndrome. 
Five subsequent papers exemplify the variety of new experimental and 
neuroscientific methodologies brought to the study of anosognosia in later years, 
ranging from functional neuroimaging to carefully conducted, experimental 
paradigms of relevant behaviours in neurological patients and healthy controls. The 
role of faulty action monitoring as a cause of anosognosia has become increasingly 
recognised, and papers by Saj et al., and Gandola et al. examine new facets of this 
explanation, using carefully controlled experimental paradigms and  neuroscientific 
methods such as transcranial direct current stimulation (tDCS). They are followed by 
a report by Baier et al., of the first ever functional imaging (fMRI) study of 
anosognosia following unilateral left-hemisphere stroke, in which language 
lateralisation was reversed to the right-hemisphere. A study of anosognosia for 
hemiplegia by Besharati et al. looks beyond the motor accounts, and at the potential 
role of emotional and motivational factors in anosognosia, providing empirical 
confirmation for some of the claims made by Turnbull et al. Finally, McKay, 
Buchmann, Germann, Yu and Brugger introduce the novel idea of studying 
‘nosognosia’ in healthy people, in order to identify the normal function that is 
disrupted in patients with anosognosia.  
 A further three studies examine anosognosia for different domains following 
stroke, thereby highlighting a major development in anosognosia research: i.e. the 
existence of multiple, modular awareness systems that can give rise to different, 
specific forms of anosognosia. First, Canzano et al. suggest a new form of 
anosognosia in which patients are unaware of apraxia, while, Pia et al. continue the 
theme with an examination of anosognosia for hemianaesthesia (i.e. loss of tactile 
sensibility on the contralesional body side). Ronchi and Vallar then examine 
unawareness of unilateral spatial neglect, demonstrating that awareness even within a 
given domain (i.e. visual-spatial ability) can vary considerably. 
In the final papers of the special issue we examine anosognosia in relation to 
Alzheimer’s disease, and consider a specific disorder of body ownership unawareness, 
whose relation with anosognosia remains debated. First, Starkstein provides a 
valuable summary of the advances made in research into anosognosia in Alzheimer’s 
disease, covering key issues relating to diagnosis, frequency, proposed mechanisms 
and clinical correlates. The complexity of the issue as highlighted by this review, and 
the complex research task that lie ahead, are suitably illustrated by the next paper by 
Spalletta et al., who examine the neuroanatomical correlates of impaired awareness in 
patients with amnestic mild cognitive impairment. Finally, Feinberg and Venneri 
focus on aberrant body ownership following right-hemisphere stroke in their review 
of somatoparaphrenia. Their paper examines the neuroanatomical and functional 
mechanisms responsible for this rare disorder, and provides unique 
neuropsychological insights into the fundamental constituents of the bodily self.  
 
3. Beyond Babinski and this Issue: New Questions for the Next 100 Years 
Overall, the papers in this special issue highlight the diverse and significant 
advances that have been made in anosognosia research over the past 100 years. As 
aforementioned, several of the questions raised during Babinski’s time have been 
addressed, while others remain debated today. However, most interestingly, this issue 
also offers a view of new questions and novel directions for research. We summarise 
below what we feel are the three major directions that 21st century research on 
anosognosia is likely to take.  
One of the greatest outstanding challenges is the need to develop an adequate, 
multifaceted explanation of anosognosia across patients and disorders. A century of 
research has found anosognosia to be ever more complex – and attempts to develop a 
‘single deficit’ explanation have been accordingly fruitless and ultimately futile. 
Future research must provide a unified framework of normal brain function that is 
able to explain the dynamic, heterogeneous and multifaceted nature of anosognosia. 
Recent cognitive accounts of anosognosia have responded by proposing models that 
combine multiple top-down and bottom-up factors (e.g. Davies, Davies, & Coltheart, 
2005; Mograbi & Morris, 2013; Vuilleumier, 2004), whereas a ‘predictive coding’ 
account (see Fotopoulou, 2012; & in press) draws on a ‘free energy’ computational, 
model of normal brain function (Friston, 2009) to unify such factors under one 
common operating principle. Although further empirical research is needed to test 
these new models, they hold the potential of asking new, better questions about the 
nature of anosognosia. For example, future studies could clarify the neural and 
psychological reasons why in certain patients anosognosia is specific to particular 
domains, while in others it can affect several deficits; or why in certain patients 
anosognosia disappears after a few days, while in others it last for years.  
Developing an adequate explanation of anosognosia in the future will also 
depend on how we define and examine fundamental properties of the mind, such as 
self-consciousness. Recent cognitive neuroscience research has distinguished 
different components of bodily self-consciousness (i.e. agency and body ownership), 
and examined these using transient multisensory illusions and functional 
neuroimaging in healthy controls (e.g. Tsakiris, Longo, & Haggard, 2010). This work 
provides a new and productive way of studying self-consciousness; however, the 
phenomenally elusive constituents of the self remain difficult to examine using such 
illusions. By contrast, patients with anosognosia and related disorders provide a more 
stable and rich source of data regarding the neurocognitive bases of self-
consciousness. Using advanced structural and functional brain imaging to study 
anosognosia can, therefore, reveal both the mechanisms underlying the disorder and 
neuroanatomical correlates of self-consciousness. It follows, that it may soon be 
possible to relate anosognosia to other awareness concepts such as the concept of 
‘insight’ as used in psychiatry, as well as the lack of illness appreciation as observed 
in eating and functional disorders. 
Studying the neuroanatomical bases of anosognosia may also provide new 
approaches for rehabilitation and restoration of awareness. This raises several 
important questions for the future: can we predict who will develop anosognosia and 
how the condition will evolve over time?  Can we use this information to personalise 
treatment and ensure the best prognosis? And perhaps most importantly - can we 
restore normal awareness? Existing research has already proven successful at 
identifying the clinical and anatomical predictors of recovery from other stroke-
induced deficits, such as aphasia (Forkel et al., 2014) and visuospatial neglect 
(Karnath, Rennig, Johannsen, & Rorden, 2011). Similarly, several studies in this issue 
have identified the neuroanatomical correlates of anosognosia (e.g. Baier et al.; 
Besharati et al.; Pia et al.; and Spalletta et al.), and show that a change in awareness 
can be produced using simple behavioural or neuromodulatory techniques (e.g. 
Besharati et al.; Gandola et al.; and Ronchi & Vallar). These findings are certainly 
promising; however, further experimental studies, and randomised controlled trials 
are needed to identify the optimal methods for predicting recovery or restoring 
awareness.  
Importantly, future research that seeks to understand and develop treatments 
for anosognosia may involve a paradigm shift that also holds unprecedented potential 
for: (i) understanding the ways in which the brain changes plastically or reorganises 
its higher order cognitive functions following brain damage; and (ii) exemplifying the 
interrelation between the mind, body, brain and person. The hope is the research into 
anosognosia can pave the way for a more integrative, multidisciplinary approach to 
brain damage, which considers its effects on the brain, the individual, and the 
environment. Thus, the next 100 years of anosognosia research may serve as an 
indispensable window of insight into the neurobiology of a fundamental property of 





Amanzio, M., Monteverdi, S., Giordano, A., Soliveri, P., Filippi, P., & Geminiani, G. 
(2010). Impaired awareness of movement disorders in Parkinson’s disease. Brain 
and Cognition, 72(3), 337–46. doi:10.1016/j.bandc.2009.10.011 
Babinski, J. (1914). Contribution à l’étude des troubles mentaux dans l’hémiplégie 
organique cérébrale (anosognosie). Revue Neurologique (Paris), 27, 845-848. 
Berti, A., Bottini, G., Gandola, M., Pia, L., Smania, N., Stracciari, A., … Paulesu, E. 
(2005). Shared cortical anatomy for motor awareness and motor control. Science, 
309(5733), 488–491. doi:10.1126/science.1110625 
Berti, A., Spinazzola, L., Pia, L., Rabuffetti, M., Haggard, P., Rossetti, Y., & Kawato, 
M. (2007). Motor awareness and motor intention in anosognosia for hemiplegia. 
In Sensorimotor foundations of higher cognition (pp. 163–181). Oxford: Oxford 
University Press. 
Bisiach, E., Vallar, G., Perani, D., Papagno, C., Berti, A., & Neurologica, C. (1986). 
Unawareness of disease following lesions of the right hemisphere: Anosognosia 
for hemiplegia and anosognosia for hemianopia. Neuropsychologia, 24(4), 471–
482. 
Cocchini, G., Beschin, N., Cameron, A., Fotopoulou, A., & Della Sala, S. (2009). 
Anosognosia for motor impairment following left brain damage. 
Neuropsychology, 23(2), 223–30. 
Davies, M., Davies, A. A., & Coltheart, M. (2005). Anosognosia and the Two-Factor 
Theory of delusions. Mind and Language, 20(2), 209–236. 
Feinberg, T. E., Roane, D. M., & Ali, J. (2000). Illusory limb movements in 
anosognosia for hemiplegia. Journal of Neurology, Neurosurgery, and 
Psychiatry, 68(4), 511–3. 
Forkel, S. J., Thiebaut de Schotten, M., Dell’Acqua, F., Kalra, L., Murphy, D. G. M., 
Williams, S. C. R., & Catani, M. (2014). Anatomical predictors of aphasia 
recovery: A tractography study of bilateral perisylvian language networks. Brain, 
137(7), 2027–2039. 
Fotopoulou, A. (in press). The Virtual Bodily Self: The Mentalisation of the Body as 
Revealed in Anosognosia for Hemiplegia. Consciousness and Cognition. 
Fotopoulou, A. (2012). Illusions and delusions in anosognosia for hemiplegia: From 
motor predictions to prior beliefs. Brain : A Journal of Neurology, 135(5), 1344–
6. doi:10.1093/brain/aws094 
Fotopoulou, A. (2014). Time to get rid of the “Modular” in neuropsychology: A 
unified theory of anosognosia as aberrant predictive coding. Journal of 
Neuropsychology, 8(1), 1–19. doi:10.1111/jnp.12010 
Fotopoulou, A., Tsakiris, M., Haggard, P., Vagopoulou, A., Rudd, A., & Kopelman, 
M. (2008). The role of motor intention in motor awareness: An experimental 
study on anosognosia for hemiplegia. Brain, 131(12), 3432–42. 
Friston, K. (2009). The free-energy principle: a rough guide to the brain? Trends in 
Cognitive Sciences, 13(7), 293–301. doi:10.1016/j.tics.2009.04.005 
Jenkinson, P. M., Edelstyn, N. M. J., Stephens, R., & Ellis, S. J. (2009). Why are 
some Parkinson disease patients unaware of their dyskinesias? Cognitive and 
Behavioral Neurology, 22(2), 117 121. doi:10.1097/WNN.0b013e3181a722b0 
Jenkinson, P. M., & Fotopoulou, A. (2010). Motor awareness in anosognosia for 
hemiplegia: Experiments at last! Experimental Brain Research, 204(3), 295–304. 
doi:10.1007/s00221-009-1929-8 
Karnath, H.-O., Baier, B., & Nägele, T. (2005). Awareness of the functioning of one’s 
own limbs mediated by the insular cortex? The Journal of Neuroscience, 25, 
7134–7138. 
Karnath, H.-O., Rennig, J., Johannsen, L., & Rorden, C. (2011). The anatomy 
underlying acute versus chronic spatial neglect: A longitudinal study. Brain, 
134(3), 903–912. 
Mograbi, D. C., & Morris, R. G. (2013). Implicit awareness in anosognosia: clinical 
observations, experimental evidence, and theoretical implications. Cognitive 
Neuroscience, 4(3-4), 181–97. doi:10.1080/17588928.2013.833899 
Prigatano, G. P. (Ed.). (2010). The study of anosognosia. New York: Oxford 
University Press. 
 
Prigatano, G.P. & Schacter, D.L. (Eds.). (1991). Awareness of deficit after brain 
injury: Clinical and theoretical issues. New York: Oxford University Press. 
Tsakiris, M., Longo, M. R., & Haggard, P. (2010). Having a body versus moving your 
body: Neural signatures of agency and body-ownership. Neuropsychologia, 
48(9), 2740–2749. doi:DOI 10.1016/j.neuropsychologia.2010.05.021 
Vuilleumier, P. (2004). Anosognosia: The neurology of beliefs and uncertainties. 
Cortex, 40, 9–17. 
 
 
 
